Lipset's 'Democracy in Private Government' was a remarkable publication for three reasons. It was his first attempt to challenge Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy' and would lead to a programme of research that that would culminate with the publication of the widely admired classic study Union Democracy. Second, the inspiration for this work came from Lipset's student days when he was a socialist activist trying to understand why leftist governments often failed to carry out substantial programmes of social reform. Third, although it was one of his earliest publications it bears all the hallmarks of the work that would subsequently make Lipset a giant of political sociology: the enthusiasm for classic sociological problems; the appreciation of history; and the ingenious use of the small n comparative approach. Finally, I would argue that Lipset's study of democracy within private government represents a missed opportunity for sociology though there are signs that this is being rectified in recent years.
Introduction
When 'Democracy in Private Government: A Case Study of the International Typographical Union' was published in 1952 Seymour Martin (Marty) Lipset was a relatively unknown young American scholar holding a research grant at the Institute of Industrial Relations at the University of California. Though he had already completed a book on agrarian socialism (Lipset 1950 ) and published papers in the Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science (Lipset 1948 ) and the British Journal of Sociology (Lipset and Bendix 1951) , there seemed little to suggest that the then thirty year old academic would go on to become a towering figure in political sociology and political science. Indeed, his interest in unusual social phenomena, such as agrarian socialist government in the Canadian province of Saskatchewan (Lipset 1950 ) and democracy within a small craft-workers' union (International Typographical Union), along with his penchant for publishing in non-American journals, might have suggested a relatively undistinguished career in the making. Instead, as we now know, he would build a reputation as an expert on democracy, social stratification, and American exceptionalism, become one of the most heavily cited of all social scientists (Marks 2007 Though 'Democracy in Private Government' has rarely been cited I would argue that it is of interest for at least four reasons. The first is that it was a preliminary paper from a body of research that would eventually result in the much admired classic of mid-century American sociology, Union Democracy (Lipset, Trow and Coleman 1956 ). Published in 1956, Union Democracy was also responsible for helping to launch the careers of two other exceptional sociologists, Martin Trow, who would later make a name in the sociology of higher education, and, in particular, James Coleman who would go on to become at least as influential as the senior author and instigator of the project.
Unfortunately, for the British Journal of Sociology, future references to Lipset's research on democracy within the International Typographical Union (ITU) would list the book rather than the earlier article, with the book eventually being declared a 'citation classic' by the ISI in 1988 (Lipset 1988 ). Even so, in his later years Lipset would write that he felt that the research, especially its theoretical emphasis on what is now known as civil society, was rather neglected by those scholars who (re)discovered the relationship between democracy and civil society during the 1980s and 1990s. He suspected that the ITU findings did not feed into this literature for two reasons: it was published back in the 1950s; and it dealt with the unfashionable topic of trade unions (Lipset 2004: 186) .
From socialism to sociology
The second reason why the 'Private Government' paper is of interest is because it was inspired by the radical leftist politics of the 1930s and 1940s. Though Lipset was inspired by political values he was always a good Weberian in the sense that he continually sought to separate his values from his analysis, findings and conclusions. Nonetheless, his research had political intentions in that he wanted to resolve or, at least, contribute to political discussions of his time. The union democracy project, and much of his early work, grew out of debates he had been involved in as a student when he was active in socialist politics. Indeed, Lipset had, at one point, served as the national chairman of a Trotskyist organization called the Young People's Socialist League, which was the youth section of the American Socialist party (Lipset 2004: 173) . On entering City College, New York, he would join a celebrated group of anti-Stalinist student radicals who would eventually go on to become influential academics and public intellectuals. In addition to Lipset, the group included such luminaries as Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Irving Howe, Irving Kristol, Philip Selznick and Peter Rossi (Lipset 2004: 177) . 2 In his autobiographical essay 'Steady Work' Lipset relates how he and other members of this group became pre-occupied with the question of why Marxist and social democratic parties in a wide range of countries appeared to be more concerned with gaining and maintaining power than undertaking any kind of significant programme of social reform (Lipset 2004: 177-180) . The most striking example for someone who grew up in the 1930s was, of course, the Soviet Union where a Marxist inspired revolution created a ruling elite that was characterized more by dictatorship than democracy.
The best explanation that Lipset could find for Stalinism and the failures of social democracy was Robert Michels Political Parties (Michels 1962 (Michels [1915 ) , a book that had been recommended to him by a fellow student radical, Philip Selznick. Michels, a former student of Weber's set himself the task of resolving a common paradox: why is it that groups or organizations that have been established, at least in part, to promote democratic values, should so often have leaders who hold their offices for 'life'? Michels answer was that oligarchic domination is inevitable within large-scale organizations regardless of how democratic or autocratic they may have been when founded. In a now well-known quote, Michels proclaimed: 'It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy' (Michels 1962 (Michels [1915 : 365).
According to Michels' theory, oligarchical tendencies arise within voluntary associations, such as trade unions and political parties, because direct participation by every member in every decision is simply not possible. 'Representative democracy' and the demands of organization invariably produce a small group of leaders who enjoy high levels of power, status, and income. The tragedy of these sometime radical leaders is that no matter how much they wish to promote 'democracy' they find it difficult to step aside and relinquish these privileges. Furthermore, in clinging to office they find that they can take advantage of their position to fend off potential opponents. Specifically, they can use their office to make their views known, to give legitimacy to those views, and to control the channels of communication within the organization. As a relatively small group, the leaders also find it easier to organize themselves into a cohesive group compared to their opponents who may often come from different sections of the membership. Finally, the leaders benefit from a phenomenon that Michels described as the apathy of the 'masses'. Though often overlooked, Michels also described a second tendency. In their desire to remain in office, the leaders, and consequently the party, frequently become more conservative in nature. The original goals of the party, for instance, become more modest, partly because of a natural tendency for operational goals to supplant purposive or political ones. Similarly, the tactics of the party or union become less radical as leaders do not wish to risk high office through spectacular defeats. What was particularly striking for young socialists was the fact that Michels had based his observations on the German Social Democratic Party. If the 'iron law' held for a political party that valued democratization then Michels had all the more reason to proclaim a universal law that held across the political spectrum.
Though Lipset was greatly impressed by Political Parties he happened to be familiar with a trade union that was a striking counter-example to oligarchical rule. This union, which happened to be his father's International Typographical Union (ITU), had a competitive two party political system that led to regular changes in the leadership. In a revealing essay on the Union Democracy project Lipset recalls how his father, a printer and life-long union member, would take his young son along to monthly meetings of the New York local (Lipset 1964a) . Lengthy discussions about union politics were also a feature of the Lipset household (Velasco 2004: 585) . Being intimately familiar with the workings of the ITU Lipset was able to turn this knowledge into a paper on why the 'iron law of oligarchy' was not a 'law' for a course on social organization led by one of the giants of American sociology, Robert K. Merton.
Fortunately for Lipset, Merton was impressed by the paper and it subsequently became the main part of his application for a fellowship that enabled him to finish his PhD at Columbia University without having to seek outside employment. It was this paper that was subsequently extended and published in the British Journal of Sociology in 1952 (Lipset 1964a: 99-100 ). An even longer version of this historically-oriented material, including the table on election returns, appeared in chapter 3 of the subsequent Union Democracy book.
In sum, Lipset's research on trade union democracy, and, indeed, his earlier work on agrarian socialism in Canada, was motivated by his background in socialist politics (Lipset 1994: 200) . Like others of his generation he would gradually make the transition from socialism to sociology. By the mid-1950s Lipset had lost his enthusiasm for socialism along with many others who lived through the Second World War, the Holocaust, Fascism, and Stalinism (Velasco 2004: 589-590) . His fellow student at City College, Nathan Glazer, who would also make the same journey remarked that 'in the mid-and late 1940s there was something about sociology -for those of us who were socialists and were becoming sociologists -that undermined faith' (Glazer 1990: 190-191 ). Whatever the reason, Lipset's early work was much too sophisticated, both in terms of theory and method, to wither in the same way as his socialism.
Lipsetian analysis
The third reason for revisiting 'Democracy in Private Government' is because it shows many of the trademarks that would subsequently be associated with Lipset's work: his fondness for the sociological classics; his appreciation of history; and his ingenious use of the small n comparative approach to social research. Lipset's enthusiasm for the classics was far from being the kind of exegetical approach associated with that strand of social theory concerned with the history of ideas. Although he admired Michels' work, Lipset's interest was really in classic sociological problems rather than authors. Furthermore, he also had a remarkable talent for identifying and persisting with theoretically and socially meaningful questions that could be made the subject of empirical research. 3 Lipset's orientation to sociological theory was emphatically of the 'middle-range' kind recommended by his mentor and former teacher, Robert Merton. For Merton, the principal use of middle-range theory in sociology is to guide empirical inquiry. Though middle-range theory involves abstractions, these are capable of being turned into propositions that can be tested through the use of empirical evidence. Yet each theory is more than a mere empirical generalization or an isolated proposition that identifies a relationship between two or more variables. Middle-range theory is, in the end, a set of assumptions from which logically related sets of propositions can be derived to explain empirical uniformities (Merton 1968: 39-41) . When viewed in these terms, Union Democracy is a classic example of middle-range theory.
Towards the end of 'Democracy and Private Government' Lipset lists a number of factors that 'make for a competition of alternative governments' including 'the existence within the larger locals of a large number of private social and athletic clubs which provide independent sources of power and influence, and opportunities for the training of new leadership' (Lipset 1952: 58) . This feature of the ITU would be given much greater prominence in the book where it became part of an extended analysis of the role of the printers' 'occupational community'. Using survey data, Lipset et None the less, the essential point is that it was social theory that initiated the research, generated the hypotheses and helped to explain the results. Coleman, who began the project as a PhD student, would later write that one of the things he learned from working with Lipset was that theory and evidence come together only if one starts with a problem and then uses that to sort the data. In elaborating on the point Coleman noted that one of the distinguishing features of the research was the use in the book of the then new methods of quantitative analyses. Although statistical analyses appear throughout Union Democracy it was, according to Coleman, 'the framework of ideas from social theory' that generated the hypotheses (Coleman 1992: 95 ).
An appreciation of history
'Democracy in Private Government' is distinctly historical in orientation. Much of the early part of the paper is spent detailing the origins of the two major factions within the ITU, the Progressives and the Independents. Both had their origins in secret societies that emerged within the union shortly after it was founded in 1850. The societies sought to preserve the union at a time when there was large-scale unemployment among printers, when activists were being fired, and when union members betrayed each other for the sake of a steady job. Over time they sought to place their members in positions of influence to prevent employer spies and lukewarm union members from diluting union goals. Following some splits in the 1920s, the opposing factions formed two parties and the secret societies were dissolved.
The major divide between the two parties was over the degree of militancy in union tactics. The Independents advocated a conciliatory approach in dealings with employers while the Progressives were more likely to favour strikes and other forms of industrial action. As Lipset noted, this division was of theoretical significance because its very existence challenged Michels' claim that political parties and unions had a tendency towards oligarchy and, consequently, conservatism. In other words, the tendency towards 'bureaucratic conservatism' was held in check by the presence of an opposition party ready to seize on any error made by the incumbent leaders. Moreover, Lipset argued that there are occasions when union leaders have to act radically rather than conservatively because, in his view, the 'law' of organization is not conservatism but survival. Drawing on historical examples, Lipset noted how the Independents were voted out of office after the Second World War because they had given a conciliatory reaction to the restrictions of the War Labor Board. By contrast, the Progressives responded with increased militancy when faced with the restrictions of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 (Lipset 1952: 59).
Lipset's use of historical evidence in 'Private Government' was partly to make a general theoretical point and partly to provide a greater understanding of how the two party systems emerged in the ITU. The latter is significant because Lipset would not let the need for theoretical generalities prevent him from drawing attention to historical specifics when he set himself the task of understanding a particular social phenomenon.
Like Tocqueville, Lipset also recognized the importance of understanding the 'point of departure'. For Tocqueville, it was the arrival of the English colonialists with their laws, customs, and religion that set the mould for the future of American democracy. For Lipset, it was the secret societies of the mid-nineteenth century that laid the foundations for the two party system of the twentieth century. (Lipset 1990; Lipset 1996) .
The importance of comparison
The ITU study has been widely praised for its research design, which is often cited as a . Furthermore, such deviant cases may also be used to understand the reasons why they do not conform to the existing theory and, ideally, generate hypotheses for further research. Significantly, this argument has become quite important for those who wish to retain a role for qualitative or small n studies within the social sciences at a time when quantitative or large n approaches appear to be in the ascendancy (e.g., Rueschemeyer 2003). 4 However, a common misconception about the ITU case is that the authors used it to refute Michels' iron law (e.g., Hakim 2000: 61). Certainly, the 'Private Government' paper claimed that: '…the "iron law of oligarchy" as Michels presented it is not a "law" (Lipset 1952: 59 ). Yet both the paper and the book go on to argue that oligarchy is endemic in large-scale organization and while there might be …much more variation in the internal organization of associations than the notion of an iron law of oligarchy would imply… the implications of our analysis for democratic organizational politics are almost as pessimistic as those postulated by Robert Michels. (Lipset 2004: 198) , such as the ITU, his understanding of these deviant cases showed him to be a master of what political scientists call the small n comparative method. His underlying logic was essentially that of the 'most similar systems design' (Przeworski and Teune 1982) in that he sought to compare cases that shared a range of common features, in an effort to hold some factors constant, while highlighting other different or unique features that were associated with the phenomenon he was trying to explain. This characteristically Lipsetian approach is, of course, now well-known through his work on American exceptionalism. To explain, for instance, why the US had different patterns of governance and class relations he compared it to other English-speaking former colonies of Great Britain (Lipset 1964b; Lipset 1996) . In seeking to explain the old Werner Sombart question of why the USA never had a mainstream socialist party he compared it with its near neighbour Canada which has a long and vibrant history of democratic socialism (Lipset and Marks 2000; Sombart 1976 ). For Lipset, the value of this approach was that it enabled him to better understand his own country by showing where it was similar to and how it differed from other countries. In a succinct and much cited methodological directive he said: 'those who know only one country know no country' (Lipset 1996: 17) .
The comparative method also makes a brief but highly effective appearance in 'Democracy in Private Government'. In a wonderful example of the difference between social scientific thinking and 'common sense' he first asked members of the ITU why it had a two-party system when most other unions did not. Their response was that it was either due to the historic traditions of chapel and union democracy or because the printers were relatively highly educated compared to other craft unions. Lipset then proceeds to argue on the basis of a 'control' or comparable case that both hypotheses were wrong.
The 'control' was the International Pressmen's Union (IPU) which had originally been part of the Typographical union in the nineteenth century and shared the same historical traditions and institutions, such as chapels. Furthermore, they worked alongside the ITU members in print shops across the USA, had similar personal characteristics, and earned broadly similar wages. But rather than having similar levels of internal democracy Lipset reports that the International Pressmen's Union was 'one of the most dictatorial unions in America'. One IPU group of leaders, for instance, held office in the union for more than thirty years until its more prominent members died. Another was repeatedly elected without opposition while many locals were denied the right to chose their own officers and some locals were even suspended for opposing the policies of the leaders (Lipset 1952: 55-56) . With these simple observations Lipset demolished the commonsensical explanations put forward by his subjects. As an analytical strategy, it was based on nothing more than judicious comparison with a comparable case. Yet it would, none the less, be a strategy that he would repeat in Union Democracy (Lipset, Trow and Coleman 1956 : 395-399) and, indeed, to great effect throughout his distinguished career.
The fall and rise of research on union democracy
It is quite possible that the sociology of trade unionism and industrial relations had its 'Golden Age' in the first two decades after World War II. In the US, James Coleman, 1 I would like to thank Rod Martin for comments on an earlier version of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies. 2 Some members of this group, notably Glazer and Kristol, would later journey across the political spectrum and become proponents of neo-conservatism. Although Bell and Lipset would also be associated with neo-conservative ideas and groups, they were never comfortable with the label. 3 Later questions included American exceptionalism (Lipset 1996) , why the USA never had a mainstream socialist political party (Lipset and Marks 2000) , and the political and social differences between the USA and Canada (Lipset 1990 ).
